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The Public Sector Look 
of  American Unionism 
Richard B. Freeman and Casey Ichniowski 
After decades in which collective bargaining with the government was 
considered virtually “impossible”  in America,’ unionization achieved 
in the 1970s and 1980s greater strength in the public sector than in the 
private sector.  In  1986  over a  third  of  public  sector workers were 
organized into unions, and over 40 percent were covered by collective 
agreements compared to a union  density in the private  sector of  14 
percent. Nearly one in three union members was a public employee. 
The  National  Education  Association, the  American  Federation of 
Teachers, the American  Federation  of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, and the Service Employees International Union (with nearly 
half its membership in the public sector) were among the largest unions 
in the country. Unions of  fire fighters and police were well-established 
exemplars of the craft-type organizations that once dominated Amer- 
ican labor. Public sector unionism had become the vibrant component 
of the American labor movement. 
Why did union density and collective bargaining prosper in the public 
sector while declining  elsewhere? What does the new  public  sector 
“look”  of organized labor mean for the economy? Do labor-manage- 
ment relations in the public sector mirror private sector patterns or do 
they  represent something  novel  on the labor scene? What can the 
private sector learn from the success of collective bargaining  in the 
public sector? 
This volume examines  these questions with: new data  on public sector 
labor laws; previously unanalyzed Census/Survey of Governments data 
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on state and local government labor relations practices; specially con- 
structed data sets on teachers, police, federal employees, and arbitra- 
tors; labor relations histories in particular states; and extracts from the 
Current Population Survey and other surveys  of individuals. These new 
data permit analyses of public sector unionism that go beyond estimat- 
ing the impact of a 0-1 union variable on wages that has been the focus 
of much past work. The research highlights fundamental  differences be- 
tween public and private sector labor relations in the conditions that 
foster or undermine unionism; the pay and employment outcomes unions 
produce; and the procedures by which unions secure benefits for their 
members. 
Studies of  the growth of public sector collective bargaining attribute 
the 1970s and 1980s spurt largely to the enactment of comprehensive 
labor laws that impose a duty to bargain on managers, often with com- 
pulsory  arbitration  to resolve  disputes. The greater effectiveness  of 
these laws than that of the National Labor Relations Act, which governs 
private sector unionism, is explained by the political incentives  that 
keep public  sector managers  from opposing  unions  and  committing 
unfair labor practices to the extent done in the private sector. 
The studies of  union  impacts find  that public  sector unions  have 
different  or more pronounced effects  than  private  sector unions  in 
several areas: reducing layoffs and unemployment and increasing em- 
ployment  of  members; raising  wages  of  nonunion  workers through 
“spillover”  or “threat”  effects; and increasing expenditures in orga- 
nized departments. In addition, teacher unionism has been found to 
be  associated with  higher  student test scores. As  a  result  of  these 
impacts, the wage differential between union and nonunion workers, 
commonly used to measure what unions do, understates the impact of 
unionism on the public sector. 
Finally, the research shows that public sector unionism affects out- 
comes in ways that go beyond standard collective bargaining: through 
lobbying and political campaigning that influence both the goals and 
behavior of management and citizens’ views about desired public ser- 
vices, and through use of final outcome arbitration to resolve impasses 
rather than the traditional strike weapon. 
The Central Role of  Labor Laws in Public Sector Labor Relations 
Students of the U.S. Labor movement have long debated the role of 
labor law  in  unionization.  Some argue that laws are a fundamental 
determinant of union strength, crediting (blaming) the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1936 and decisions of the War Labor Board for much 
of the rise of private sector unionism in the 1940s, and blaming (cred- 
iting) union decline in the 1970s and  1980s on the ensuing failure of 
labor law  to control illegal  management  activities  in  representation 3  Introduction:  The Public Sector Look of American Unionism 
elections.Z  Others, noting union successes in periods of legal adversity 
and the ability of management and labor to circumvent legal restric- 
tions, feel that laws have little effect on unionism.3 
The variation  in public  sector labor laws among states and occu- 
pations at a point in time and over time-which  ranges from outlawing 
collective bargaining to providing arbitration mechanisms  to resolve 
contract disputes-provides  a “natural  experiment”  to evaluate the 
role of legal enactment in the evolution of  collective bargaining. Ac- 
cordingly, NBER researchers  developed a data set measuring public 
sector labor  law  from  1955, when  bargaining  with  the government 
seemed impossible, to 1984, when many states had enacted compre- 
hensive  public  sector labor  laws;  they  obtained  data  on  collective 
contracts in  Ohio and Illinois,  industrial  states whose public  sector 
unionization prior to enactment of laws are oft-cited counter examples 
to the claim that laws are important; and they determined the dates 
when  police  departments  first  signed  collective  contracts  in  cities 
throughout the country. Analyses of these data yield five broad con- 
clusions about the role of labor law in the rise of collective bargaining 
in the public sector. 
I. The legal environment is critical in determining whether or not  public 
sector employers bargain collectively with their workers. 
The evidence is threefold. First, favorable state public sector labor 
laws increase the probability that a municipal department is governed 
by a collective contract, even when other diverse determinants of con- 
tract  status, including extent  of  union  membership4 and  the  city  in 
which a department is located, are held fixed (Freeman and Valletta, 
this volume, chap. 3, tables 3.2 and 3.3). Second, passage of compre- 
hensive public sector labor laws induced sharp increases in the per- 
centage of departments bargaining within a state. Among police, research 
indicates that the impact of laws is so substantial that within eight years 
of  enactment of laws mandating arbitration virtually all departments 
bargain contractually with their workers, while in the absence of laws 
it would take “forever”  (252 years) for workers to achieve such cov- 
erage (Ichniowski, this volume, chap.  1, table 1.2, figure 1.2). Third, 
analysis of Ohio and Illinois shows that the 1983 comprehensive public 
sector laws enacted in these “exceptions” induced dramatic spurts in 
contract coverage: in Illinois the probability that school districts signed 
contracts increased by 32 percentage points within a year of enactment 
(Saltzman, this volume, chap. 2, table 2.4). Moreover, unionism prior 
to passage of the laws was abetted by favorable court decisions on the 
legality of collective bargaining. While not “necessary”  for unioniza- 
tion, favorable public sector labor laws seem to be a sufficient condition 
for rapid growth. 4  Richard B. FreemadCasey  Ichniowski 
2. Economic benefits and costs do not readily explain the timing of 
public sector labor laws. 
The trend in public sector labor law has been, first, to legalize union 
activity and require managers to “meet and confer” with unions; sec- 
ond, to require managers to bargain with unions; and, third, to mandate 
arbitration or other final closure mechanisms to guarantee a contract 
(Valletta and Freeman, this volume, appendix B). To  the extent that 
passage  of  the laws  themselves depends  on fundamental economic 
forces, the factors that determine enactment of laws should be part of 
the economic analysis of union growth. Can we identify such factors? 
While cross-state comparisons show that state characteristics such 
as per capita income and public expenditures are associated with public 
sector laws favorable to unionism (Kochan  1973; Faber and Martin 
1980; Hunt, White, and Moore  1985), analysis of changes over time 
fail to turn up systematic factors that cause states to enact laws earlier 
rather than later (Farber, this volume, chap. 5). Different states moved 
at different  speeds toward  comprehensive public  sector labor laws, 
apparently for “idiosyncratic”  political reasons involving patronage, 
personalities, and union rivalry rather than broad economic or social 
factors. That Ohio and Illinois did not enact comprehensive labor laws 
until 1983 is consistent with this pattern. Viewed negatively, the inabil- 
ity to explain the timing of state labor laws suggests limits to economic 
analysis of  legal developments and the  need for detailed  legislative 
histories to understand changes. Viewed positively, the finding suggests 
that treating the timing of the laws as exogenous does not create sig- 
nificant biases in analyzing the impact of laws on bargaining and thus 
strengthens the conclusion that laws can be treated as an independent 
cause of the growth of collective bargaining. 
3. Public sector laws favorable to collective bargaining raise wages in 
nonunion as well as union departments but have substantial adverse 
employment consequences only for nonunion departments. 
By  spurring collective bargaining, public sector labor laws are in- 
directly responsible for union-induced changes in wages and employ- 
ment. In addition, the laws affect economic outcomes by  enhancing 
the bargaining power of unions and altering management decisions in 
nonunion departments as well. 
Indicative of the impact of laws on union bargaining strength, union- 
ized workers in  municipal departments in states with laws favorable 
to collective bargaining receive about 6 percent higher pay than those 
in states with unfavorable laws and appear to experience a comparable 
increase in pay following passage of favorable laws.5 Indicative of the 5  Introduction: The Public Sector Look of  American Unionism 
apparent impact  of  the laws  on nonunion departments, the pay  of 
nonunion  municipal workers is about 3 percent higher in states with 
comprehensive public sector labor laws than in other states, seemingly 
as a result of the “threat”  that those workers will also unionize. The 
employment consequences of  strong collective  bargaining  laws,  by 
contrast, differ between union and nonunion departments: unionized 
departments experience only marginally lower employment in favor- 
able legal environments despite higher  wages whereas nonunion  de- 
partments suffer  considerable job loss,  suggesting  that  unions use 
some of the power they attain from favorable legislation to maintain 
employment (Freeman and Valletta, this volume, chap. 3, tables 3.5 
and 3.7). 
4. Among  states  that  obligate employers to bargain, wages  are  no 
higher with compulsory arbitrution than with other dispute resolution 
mechanisms,  whereas  wages  are  noticeably  higher  with  strike- 
permitted laws. 
One of the hallmarks of public sector labor relations is the use of 
dispute resolution mechanisms, including compulsory interest arbitra- 
tion of various forms, in place of strikes and lockouts. While at one 
time public sector unions opposed such alternatives to the strike, more 
recently management has alleged that arbitration favors unions. Dra- 
matizing this complaint in 1977, one Massachusetts mayor stripped to 
his shorts before television cameras to show that arbitration was “strip- 
ping” the city of its money (New Bedford Standard-Times, 25 January 
1977). Extant research, however, finds that arbitrated settlements are, 
if anything, lower than negotiated settlements (Ashenfelter and Bloom 
1984). This leaves only one possible way for arbitration to raise wages: 
by  creating an environment in  which  cities agree to high negotiated 
settlements for fear that arbitrators will impose even higher wages. If 
this were true, cities in states with compulsory arbitration would pay 
more for comparable labor (all else the same) than cities in states that 
simply require employers to bargain  with unions; pay would rise es- 
pecially rapidly when state laws changed from duty-to-bargain to com- 
pulsory arbitration. The evidence, however, shows that pay in states 
with compulsory arbitration laws does not differ noticeably from that 
in  other duty-to-bargain  states, whereas pay  is  on the order of 2-9 
percent higher in states that permit strikes (Freeman and Valletta, this 
volume, chap. 3, table 3.8). That arbitration has little impact on wages 
in  states that encourage bargaining  is important in  light of evidence 
that arbitration laws reduce strike rates (Ichniowski 1982), for it sug- 
gests that compulsory arbitration resolves impasses without strikes- 
the aim of these laws-without  increasing wages and salaries. 6  Richard B. FreernadCasey lchniowski 
5. Arbitrators do not favor one side or the other nor respond greatly 
to the facts of a case when labor and management make  “reason- 
able” proposals; rather, they tend to “split the difference.” 
The question of the extent to which arbitrators split the difference 
between offers as opposed to making independent  judgments based on 
the facts is a long-standing one. One way to evaluate arbitrator behavior 
is to devise “laboratory-type experiments” in  which  the researcher 
asks arbitrators to settle pseudocases that isolate the effect of given 
conditions on outcomes. In an NBER experiment, the researcher asked 
arbitrators to resolve cases patterned after actual contract disputes and 
varied the settlements proposed by labor and management. In a set of 
identical cases, arbitrators tended to split the difference between offers, 
giving higher (lower) awards when management or labor offers were 
high (low) even under identical factual situations (Bloom, this volume, 
chap. 4).  At first blush this  might  suggest that the best  strategy for 
unions and management is to make extreme proposals  regardless  of 
the facts. This would be an incorrect inference, however, as arbitrators 
do indeed  place  primary  weight  on facts when  offers and facts are 
unrelated (Bazerman and Farber 1985). Arbitrators split the difference 
when they feel the proposals of the two sides reflect the facts. As in 
actual cases both sides generally base offers on the facts, the result is 
that arbitrators often split the differences in actual practice. 
The Effects of Public Sector Collective Bargaining on Wages 
Following the private sector union literature, much research on pub- 
lic sector unionism has examined the impact of unions on wages. Re- 
viewing this extensive body of  research, Lewis (this volume, chap. 6) 
concludes that: 
6. Unionlnonunion earnings differences tend to be smaller in the public 
sector than in the private sector but vary considerably among workers 
and are far from negligible. 
On average the earnings of union workers exceed those of nonunion 
workers by 8-13  percent in the public sector, which  is about 5 per- 
centage points lower than unionlnonunion earnings differences in the 
private sector. However, some groups of unionized public sector work- 
ers obtain as large (local government workers) or larger (public school 
teachers) earnings advantages over nonunion workers as does the av- 
erage unionized private sector worker. Looking at demographic groups, 
unionhonunion earnings differences are higher for women than for men 
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workers. Among occupations outside of teaching, union earnings ad- 
vantages are smaller for blue-collar workers in the public sector than 
in the private sector, at least among males, and are modest for police, 
fire fighters, and most hospital workers. 
The new NBER research adds to and modifies the findings of earlier 
work, leading to three further findings: 
7. Nonunion workers appear to benejit  from the presence of  unionism 
in the public sector, receiving higher pay in states with laws  favorable 
to collective  bargaining  and  in  cities  where  other  workers  are 
unionized. 
The first bit of evidence of wage spillovers in the public sector is the 
finding, noted under point 3 above, that the earnings of nonunion work- 
ers in states with laws that favor collective bargaining are higher than 
the earnings of nonunion workers in other states, all else held fixed. 
The second piece of evidence is that nonunion  workers earnings in- 
creased especially rapidly  in  states that enacted comprehensive col- 
lective bargaining laws compared to nonunion worker earnings in other 
states (Freeman and Valletta, this volume, chap. 3, tables 3.5 and 3.7). 
The third piece of evidence is that workers in unorganized departments 
of a city receive higher pay when workers in other departments are 
organized (Zax and Ichniowski, this volume, chap. 12, tables 12.3 and 
12.6). Wage “spillover”  from organized police to fire fighters, where 
pay  parity  is an explicit  issue  in  collective bargaining, is especially 
pronounced. The interpretation of these relations as resulting from the 
threat of union organization is supported by other research showing 
that, among police at least, low-wage departments have  the highest 
chances of being organized (Ichniowski, Freeman, and Lauer 1987). 
8. Public sector wages rise  with size  of  department, partly because 
larger cities have a greater ability to pay, as rejected in property 
values and family incomes, while wage differences between union 
and nonunion public sector workers depend modestly on the city’s 
ability to  pay. 
In the private  sector, pay increases with the size of firm or estab- 
lishment, particularly in the nonunion sector, implying that unions raise 
wages  less at large  workplaces. Do wages  rise with  size and union 
premiums fall with size in the public sector as well? What is the effect 
of controlling for measures of the size of department or city and the 
ability to pay on the union wage premium? 
Increases in  pay with size in the public sector are about as large as 
the increases in pay with size in the private sector, but they reveal a 8  Richard B. FreemanKasey Ichniowski 
different pattern by union status, with union  effects on wages inde- 
pendent or increasing with size. Data on individuals from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) indicate that a 10 percent increase in the size 
of a government unit is associated with a 0.2 percent increase in wages6 
and a rise in the union wage premium of about 0.4 percent, other factors 
held fixed. The rise in the union  premium at larger workplaces  may 
reflect greater union political power where employment is greater or 
possibly the ability of strong unions to raise employment as well as 
wages (see point  10  below).  Data from the Survey of Governments 
(SOG) on municipal  departments show a more pronounced relation 
between size and pay,  with a 10 percent  increase in  size associated 
with a 0.4 percent increase in pay, but no change in the union premium 
with size (Brown and Medoff, this volume, chap. 7, table 7.3).  As far 
as can be told, moreover, only about a fifth of the increase in pay with 
city size results from factors such as property values that measure a 
city’s “ability to pay.” Similarly, while some of the public sector union/ 
nonunion wage differential can be attributed to disproportionate union- 
ization of larger departments and of workers in cities with greater ability 
to pay, the vast bulk of the effect must be attributed to unionism per 
se rather than to these correlates. 
9. Despite the fact that federal employee unions do not negotiate pay, 
many federal workers earn more than they would in the private sector, 
producing queues for  federal jobs. 
The question of whether federal employees are paid  more or less 
than otherwise comparable workers in the labor market has generated 
considerable controversy.  Comparisons of wages based on the CPS, 
which contains information for individual characteristics, show federal 
employees to be relatively highly paid (Smith 1977), with the greatest 
differences  being  among  minorities  and  women  (Asher and Popkin 
1984). Comparisons of wages in narrowly defined occupations gives, 
however,  the opposite pattern, with  significant pay  disadvantage  to 
federal workers in  the late  1970s and  1980s (Freeman 1988). Which 
picture of federal pay is right‘? 
Evidence from workers who move between federal and private em- 
ployment supports the view that federal pay is relatively  high for av- 
erage workers, as those who move from private to federal employment 
obtain larger wage gains than those who move from one private em- 
ployer to another.  In addition, Civil Service Commission data show 
sizeable  queues  for  federal  employment  (Krueger,  this  volume, 
chap. 8). As federal worker unions do not negotiate pay, these wage 
advantages cannot be attributed to collective bargaining. One possible 
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public sector, is that the federal government is by far the nation’s largest 
employer. Another possibility is that the federal government’s national 
pay  scale-chosen for reasons of administrative  ease, internal labor 
market mobility, and politics-requires  that average pay be high enough 
to attract labor in high-wage local markets. 
The Effects of Public Sector Unionism on Employment, Labor 
Turnover, Output, and Budgets 
Because union  wage  effects  are smaller in  the public  than  in  the 
private sector, it is common to conclude that public sector unions are 
weaker than their private sector counterparts. NBER research rejects 
this notion because of the pronounced effects of public sector unionism 
on other labor market outcomes-employment,  layoffs, output, and 
budgets. 
10. Public sector unionism raises employment of  organized workers. 
It is generally held that private sector union wage gains come at the 
expense of employment, as enterprises economize on more expensive 
labor.’  The pattern in the public sector seems to be quite different. 
Consistent with earlier work (Zax 1985), comparisons of employment 
across cities show that with diverse factors held fixed, departments 
that bargain collectively hire more workers than otherwise similar de- 
partments that do not bargain collectively (Freeman and Valletta, this 
volume, chap. 3, tables 3.5 and 3.6; Zax and Ichniowski, this volume, 
chap. 12, tables  12.1-12.3).  Coupled with the positive impact of col- 
lective bargaining  on wages, this implies that payrolls are higher  in 
union departments and also produces higher total expenditures in those 
departments (Zax and Ichniowski, this volume, chap. 12, tables 12.4 
and 12.5). Only among teachers have NBER researchers failed to find 
a positive bargaining effect on employment (Kleiner and Petree, this 
volume, chap. 11, table  11.6), though here other recent research has 
detected such effects (Eberts and Stone 1986). 
There are two possible reasons why employment of unionized labor 
might be higher in the public sector despite higher wages. One is that 
public sector unions shift the demand for members’ services through 
political activity-lobbying  and campaigning for additional public ex- 
penditures that increase both wages and employment. An alternative 
explanation  is that unions use their bargaining  strength to force em- 
ployers off demand curves in accord with union preferences for jobs 
(producing so-called  efficient contracts), for instance, by demanding 
contract clauses that specify a minimum number of police per cruiser, 
or  fire fighters per shift or piece of equipment, or pupils per classroom. 10  Richard B. FreemanKasey Ichniowski 
Without denying union use of collective bargaining  to alter employ- 
ment, the fact that city councils and legislatures need not appropriate 
the money to finance negotiated settlements forces unions to comple- 
ment contract provisions with political and lobbying activities that af- 
fect the level  of  demand. In  the  public  sector unions  cannot  rely 
exclusively on collective bargaining behind closed doors to obtain de- 
sired agreements, efficient or not. 
11. Public sector unionism reduces layoffs  and unemployment but has 
only marginal effects on quits. 
The impact of unionism on turnover are strikingly different in the 
public sector than in the private sector (Allen, this volume, chap. lo). 
Unions in the public sector reduce substantially temporary and indef- 
inite layoffs, whereas they increase those layoffs in the private sector 
(Medoff 1979). The magnitudes of the public sector effects are, more- 
over, quite large:  in  the mid-to-late  1970s the likelihood  that public 
sector employees would be on temporary or indefinite layoff was 40 
pecent less for unionized than nonunion  employees, whereas in the 
private sector  unionists were three times more likely to be on temporary 
or indefinite layoff than nonunion workers (Allen, this volume, chap. 
10, table  10.3). On the other hand, quit rates, which unionism lowers 
markedly in the private sector (Freeman 1980), are barely affected by 
union status in the public sector (Allen, this volume, chap. 10, tables 
10.5 and 10.6). The net of these two effects-reductions  in layoffs and 
modest impacts on quits-is  that unionism in the public sector appears 
to increase job stability and reduce the probability of unemployment 
for members. This  is consistent with  the finding that public  sector 
unionism raises employment (see point  10) and is a major element in 
our conclusion  that public  sector unions have more substantial eco- 
nomic effects than shown in simple comparisons of union and nonunion 
wages. 
12. Teacher unionism is associated with increased student test scores, 
but the reasons for this association are not well determined. 
Extant research on the impact of unionism on productivity  in the 
public  sector presents a  mixed  picture:  some studies show positive 
union effects, others find negative effects, while others report no ef- 
fects, leading to the generalization that on net unionism is neutral to 
productivity in the public sector (Freeman 1986; Methe and Perry 1980). 
Using special tabulations of student test scores and other indicators to 
measure outputs in education, NBER researchers found educational 
productivity to be somewhat higher, other factors held fixed, in more 11  Introduction:  The Public Sector Look of  American Unionism 
highly unionized states. Longitudinal data that contrast scores in the 
same state over time show a comparable result, though whether the 
effects come from the presence of a labor organization per se or from 
collective bargaining is unclear (Kleiner  and Petree, this volume, chap. 
11, table 11.8). Working separately with data for individual students 
rather than states, Eberts and Stone (1986) report comparable results 
for students with average achievement levels, but more complex ones 
for morehess able students.  Unfortunately neither study is  able to 
identify the particular factors-better  management due to union pres- 
sures? lower turnover? greater teacher effort?-by  which unionism is 
associated with greater educational productivity.8 
13. State aid to local school districts does not increase wages or em- 
ployment in a unionized setting but, rather, reduces taxes. 
When a state awards a school district unexpected grants-in-aid, how 
much of  the funds show up in higher teacher pay or employment or 
other educational expenditures as  opposed to  reductions in local taxes? 
Surprisingly, in highly unionized states such as New York (Ehrenberg 
and Chaykowski, this volume, chap. 9) and Michigan (Murnane, Singer, 
and Willett  1986), districts have used such money  largely to reduce 
property taxes. Why? One possibility is that school districts were un- 
willing to make major salary or employment commitments based on 
state financing that they view as uncertain. Another possibility is that 
the failure to raise wages or employment is a “period  effect” due to 
the 1970s and early  1980s  “tax  revolt” at the state and local levels. 
Finally, it is possible that in these states unions  used their lobbying 
resources to increase educational spending from normal funding sources 
to such an extent that taxpayers were unwilling to finance additional 
resources for schooling. Whichever interpretation is correct, the fact 
that state relief does not augment school spending highlights the lim- 
itations on the ability of unions to raise spending through  collective 
bargaining  and thus helps explain union  pressure for state laws that 
earmark increased  state aid for higher  minimum  salaries, as in New 
Jersey, or for general teachers’ salaries, as in New York, and the im- 
portance of activity outside normal collective bargaining. 
14. Public sector collective bargaining raises expenditures on unionized 
functions  but  appears  to  have  little  impact  on  total  municipal 
expenditures. 
Further evidence on the limited ability  of public  sector unions  to 
affect outcomes through bargaining is given by the surprising fact that 
while cities that bargain with unions in four municipal functions (police, 12  Richard B. FreemanXasey Ichniowski 
fire, sanitation, and street and highway workers) spend more on these 
activities than other cities, they do not have higher totul city budgets 
than cities that do not bargain with unions (Zax and Ichniowski, this 
volume, chap. 12, table 12.4). The implication is that the bulk of union- 
induced increases in expenditures on organized activities is funded by 
reallocating city moneys from nonorganized to organized activities rather 
than by  increasing total spending and taxes. If this finding is c~rrect,~ 
public sector unions would seem to have greater ability to alter line 
items in agiven city budget than to increase taxes and budgets, perhaps 
because taxpayers pay more attention to total tax bills than to expen- 
ditures on specific services. By contrast, private sector unions are more 
likely to impact bottom-line profits than the allocation of moneys within 
a firm. 
Interpreting Public Sector Labor Relations 
Despite comprehensive labor laws that mimic the National Labor 
Relations Act and a tradition of drawing on the experience of the private 
sector, public sector unions and management have evolved a new and 
different labor relations system. Why? What explains the features of 
public sector labor relations found in this volume and in other research? 
Our analysis stresses the distinct incentives and constraints that op- 
erate in political as opposed to economic markets, in particular the fact 
that public sector management and labor, unlike private employers and 
unions, must appeal to voters to support their actions. For unions, this 
creates an opportunity to affect the agenda of the employers who face 
them across the bargaining table. At the same time it makes them frame 
demands and set policies on the allocation of resources to public ser- 
vices broadly defined as well as on benefits to members, and thus go 
beyond the bargaining table to convince those who ultimately foot the 
bill of the virtue of their case. Since political influence depends in part 
on how large a group one can muster, moreover, public sector unions 
tend  to place  great weight on  employment  outcomes (see Courant, 
Gramlich, and Rubinfeld  1979). On the employer side, the fact that 
management is beholden to an electorate that includes public sector 
workers and politically active unions induces management to take a 
less adversarial approach to collective bargaining than do private sector 
managers beholden to shareholders. Further reducing the adversarial 
relation is the fact that unions can be an important ally in convincing 
the electorate, or the legislature, or other governmental bodies of the 
need to increase budgets. Finally, the belief that government employees 
should not have the right to strike has spurred public sector develop- 
ment of arbitration to resolve impasses, which itself alters the nature 
of the management-labor conflict. 13  Introduction: The Public Sector Look  of American Unionism 
Another important factor that differentiates the public sector from 
the private sector in the United States (though not in most countries) 
is the setting of public sector labor law on a decentralized state basis. 
Decentralization of  the law allows areas of the country favorably in- 
clined to unionism to encourage collective bargaining and areas with 
unfavorable attitudes to restrict it. It also has led to numerous “ex- 
periments”  with different modes of regulating union and management 
conduct and conflicts, encouraging institutional innovation and diver- 
sity. In contrast to the private  sector, where workers and employers 
have been limited to the traditional model of exclusive representation, 
bargaining-to-contract, and strikes to settle impasses, the public sector 
has offered a range of unions and union-type organizations from worker 
associations with  whom  employers need  not  bargain to full-fledged 
collective bargaining organizations with diverse alternative modes of 
impasse resolution. 
Given the greater success of collective bargaining in the public sector 
than in the private sector in the 1970s and 1980s, the time would seem 
to have come for researchers and practitioners to begin to ask what 
the private sector might learn from the public sector experience rather 
than the converse. 
Notes 
1.  In 1962 George Meany was quoted as declaring that it is “impossible to 
2. See, for example, Freeman (1988). 
3. John Dunlop, in particular, has argued that union growth occurs in spurts 
not necessarily related to  legal developments  (pers. comm. 1987). For the public 
sector, Burton (1979) has advanced the argument that policy changes are no 
more important than several other factors. 
4.  In the public sector there is considerable membership in unions without 
actual bargaining to a contract, as shown in  Freeman, Ichniowski, and Zax 
(this volume, appendix A). 
5. In these calculations a law favorable to collective bargaining is defined 
as a duty-to-bargain  law without  arbitration  or the right to strike, while an 
unfavorable environment is defined as a state without any public sector labor 
law. In the Freeman and Valletta legal index (this volume, chap. 3),  these laws 
have values of about 1 .O  and -  1 .O, respectively, indicating that they are one 
standard deviation above and below the mean in  terms of favorableness to 
collective bargaining. Hence, we have multiplied the coefficients in their tables 
by 2 to obtain the figures in the text. 
6. Brown and Medoff (this volume, chap. 7) suggest that the “company” 
employment variable is perhaps a better measure of size of government in the 
CPS file than the site employment variable, so we concentrate on  their company 
results here. 
bargain collectively with the government.”  See Kramer, (1962, 41). 14  Richard B. FreemanKasey Ichniowski 
7.  The evidence for a negative employment effect is, however, weak (Pen- 
cave1 and Hartsog 1984), and models of efficient contracts suggest that it may 
in fact be negligible if unions are able to redistribute economic rents efficiently. 
8. The failure of  these studies to identify  the mechanism  underlying the 
improved performance of schools in a union environment mirrors the general 
failure of economists to determine causes of productivity advance and the more 
specific problem in determining why productivity tends to be higher in union- 
ized settings in the private sector. 
9.  Valletta (1987) uses a different methodology  and obtains comparable re- 
sults with  the SOG data, indicating  that this finding is not  dependent on a 
particular model specification. It should, however, be corroborated with other 
data (tax rates and the like). 
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